Task:
I analyzed the risk, safety, and crowd management aspects of Ariana Grande’s Manchester Arena show, which tragically ended in a terrorist attack. My research utilized contemporary scholarly sources to identify and examine the primary failures in planning and execution that contributed to the disaster. I evaluated existing hazards, critical decision-making errors, and the roles and responsibilities of key stakeholders—including those who were in a position to intervene or raise concerns that might have prevented the incident.

In my analysis, I outlined at least two key strategies that could have mitigated the risks and improved the overall safety of the event. Additionally, I assessed the broader response by the live entertainment and event management industry, highlighting the concrete steps taken in the aftermath to improve event security, emergency preparedness, and public safety protocols.

On Monday, May 22 of 2017 Ariana Grande held her Dangerous Woman Tour in Manchester. The show itself went well and was able to conclude however it was the aftermath of Castlerock did. As fans begin to exit the stadium a bomb located in the backpack of 22-year-old perpetrator, Salman Abedi, was detonated. 1,017 individuals were injured and 23 were killed (Kerslake). So what went wrong and how could this have been avoided in this paper I will explore how ineffective security measures caused the loss of 20+ lives and how such an atrocity could've been mitigated beforehand with the use of additional security personnel, expanded CCTV, and an adequate terrorist risk assessment and threat levels.

Playing at the Manchester arena, one of the biggest indoor venues in the UK, she and the venues team should've been wearier of a potential terrorist threat. The venue doors opened at 6 PM and 21,000 fans began to arrive (Manchester Arena Inquiry). At this time security did minimal back and body checks and instead relied on metal detectors. Many attendees say they were let in despite not being checked (Lyons). Additionally, security was only stationed at the venue doors and within the venue, not around its perimeter. This is important to know as the venue, the Manchester Arena is connected to a travel hub, Victoria station open to the public and has access to the arena, making it a much higher target for terrorist attacks. At 8:30 PM the perpetrator arrived at the station and took an elevator to the concourse of the Manchester arena (Manchester Arena Inquiry). By 8:49 security missed an opportunity to stop Abedi. A few minutes later at 8:51, the terrorist enters the city room which is essentially the foyer of the arena and stays out of sight both of security and CCTV for 19 minutes (Manchester Arena Inquiry). This example of hustle reconnaissance, scoping out before the attack left an opportunity to save lives but it was missed. A few minutes later at 8:51, the terrorist enters the city room which is essentially the foyer of the arena and stays out of sight both of security and CCTV for 19

minutes. This example of hostile reconnaissance, scoping out before the attack left an opportunity to save lives but it was missed (ITV). He returned to the city room at 9:33 and waited until people began to disperse from the concert. Security staff did not identify him as a potential threat, that is until 10:15 a member of the public reported suspicious activity to security but this threat was not taken seriously. Just 15 minutes later at 10:31 PM, the bomb is detonated. It took 10 minutes for the first paramedics to arrive in over two hours for all the injured to be transported from the scene by 2:46 AM (Manchester Arena Inquiry).

Generally speaking, the hazards included a minimal assessment of terrorist threats done by show and security professionals. As well as the sheer size of the venue and lack of security patrolling all possible threat points, especially outside of the venue. Lack of security included hiring minimally trained personnel, many of which were teens as well as having blindspots in CCTV cameras. Knowing the size of the venue and the type of people that go to the events, many left-leaning progressive, queer, women, and children, the risk of an Islamic terrorist attack was higher than say a Trump Rally or even a gun show.

The risks were obvious, that the venue is connected to Victoria's Station and that soft points on the venue itself were not being patrolled. As a result, anything happening outside of the venue could and did impact those inside and exiting the venue. The perpetrator did not have to go through any security checks to take the lives of 23 people. Additionally, because of the venue's size and prime location, it was a very good target for a terrorist attack as noted by Steve Adelman, ice president of the Event Safety Alliance (cited in Rhys).
A similar incident occurred in Las Vegas that same year in 2017. Taking place at the Las Vegas route 21 harvest country music festival, 60 lives were taken through the lethal force of machine guns (Kelly, 3). The perpetrator 64-year-old paddock was stationed in a nearby hotel he found

through Internet searches. Well he did not conduct hostile reconnaissance as Almonte did, there was research that went into it. However, there are more contrasts such as the fact that unlike Manchester, Paddack “not motivated by ideological, political, religious, or social reasons...lacks the element of radicalization” (Kelly, 14). Well, this incident differs from the terrace attack in Manchester, it is similar in the fact that the harm came from outside of the venue. This is important because it expands the notion that security must go beyond a venue and be positioned around chokepoints and anywhere access is available.

In 2015 “three gunmen opened fire during an Eagles of Death Metal concert in Paris. The Attacks at Le Bataclan left 137 people dead (Knopper). Simultaneous attacks happened across the city of Paris but for this exploration, we will simply be focusing on the singular concert venue. Similar to the events in Manchester, this attack was a coordinated Islamist terrorist attack. However, the venue was much smaller than the Manchester arena holding a mere 1500 people (De la Hamaide). Despite it being a much smaller venue with smaller space to hold secure, there was still an absurd amount of lives lost. One of the reasons for such a high level of casualties is because in contrast to Manchester this attack took place in the audience. The gunmen, a total of 3 were inside the venue (Ray). As a result, Martin's law came into place, requiring venue security staff to wear body cameras and train in counter-terrorism awareness.

There are also catastrophes that have taken place that very much differ from the Manchester attack. In Lollapalooza of 2019 at the Gilroy Garlic Festival, security was able to detain a shooter within one minute of firing. Due to their quick action, further casualties were mitigated. And as a result Lollapalooza immediately put more security into place. This is important as the festival takes place on Fairgrounds in Chicago it is not an indoor venue like Manchester. So security knew how to effectively patrol the area both in and out of the

performance space. Due to effective security measures around the perimeter safety was able to be maintained to a greater degree than in the attack in Manchester.

In August 2022, in Grant County Washington at the Gorge Amphitheater, deputies prevented a mass shooting before its inception by detaining a suspect who had to load a 9 mm pistols (Henkles). Then security alerted police after seeing the perpetrator inhale a substance and then load pistols from his car into his waistband. As a result, Moody was never able to enter the venue as he was detained outside the gates. This is in part to the hypervigilance of the security team at that show that was checking not only inside the venue but around it as well. Had the shooting occurred it could've been absolutely catastrophic with upwards of 25,000 people attending (Henkles). So in contrast to Manchester, we see security actively patrolling around the venue and not brushing off potential threats but instead come on reporting them to the higher ups in contrast to Manchester we see security actively patrolling around the venue and not brushing off potential threats but instead, reporting them to the higher-ups thus saving lives in the process. As for the manchester attack, SMG, the independent promoter knew that the Arena had been identified by counter-terrorism police as a Tier 2. As a result, this category should have made clear to SMG that it was an attractive target for terrorists. Being such a large venue with key demographic and easy access points, it was the perfect target. Yet nothing was done to mitigate this risk. Despite the threat level being high, Showsec had no general written risk assessment in relation to a terrorist threat toward the public.

In addition to SMG, the concert promoter company as well as BPT, and Shoe Sec, the security companies. There were individuals liable for this disaster as well. Three specific names are mentioned routinely and hold responsibility for the disaster. Primarily, Thomas Rugby who is head of security for Ariana Grande's tour took accountability as his risk assessment document

was an inappropriately low assessment in terms of terrorism. More security could've been told out in and out of the venue the threat of terrorism was high and possibly stopping the attack from even happening. Additionally, Sharon Pates, the health safety and compliance manager at Showsec is liable for faults of the show that fateful night. Had there been effective training of guards, perhaps communication could've been increased, employees would not have been on breaks while the perpetrator was in the city room, and the threat would've been taken more seriously. The third name is James Allen who is in charge of the venue, the Manchester arena, and is the senior official owner of SMG. All three of these individuals fell behind on their duties and obligations to protect eventgoers and have to live with the responsibility of failing to acknowledge and respond to apparent risks.

Well, all the fault can't be placed on the security guards hired by Showsec, they should have been trained better. There was a report by one employee, a 19 year old Mohammed who is given information of suspicious activity which we now know to be the perpetrator. This should've been taken more seriously and communicated to higher-ups but instead, it was ignored. Showsec should bear the primary blame for this lost opportunity as Mohammed Agha was not properly trained and while he was a component of the catastrophe, it was not the sole responsibility of this teenager. Given the terrorist threat level, the venue and security should have brought in a preventative counter-terrorist squad for precautionary measures and not simply relied on low-paid and minimally trained teens.

Strategies that could have mitigated the attack include increasing peripheral security in/around Victoria and the city room as well as expanding CCTV to leave no blind spots in and around Manchester Arena. First and foremost crowd management and security employees must be increased numbers-wise. Since the incident in 2017 the pay was 5.5 pounds/hour - the amount

Kyle Lawler says he was paid. Showsec's hourly rate has increased to £9.90 per hour. Given the external soft points of the venue and the train station need to be carefully monitored, I would suggest implementing at least 100 additional highly trained guards So, for an hour, this would cost £990, then multiplied by at least 4 hours (included pre and post-show) would be £3960 for the employee pay only. Additionally, Showsec must implement additional training which costs £200 per employee for up to 8 days (Chameleon). However, the training must be expanded to include counter-terrorists threats and responses, not only crowd management. So, one can expect this to double to £400 minimum for more intensive training. Together, this costs £40,396 for increased security personnel only. In response to the lack of CCTV, an additional 20 to 30 cameras should be installed in blind spots. The average cost of one high-quality camera is £1,158, plus an installation fee of roughly £200 each (CrimeRate). The sum CCTV expansion would cost an estimated £40,740. All these changes would add up to a minimum of £81,670 additional per show.

Given these measures were put into place the attack most likely would've not occurred. The perpetrator could've been caught before detonating the bomb. People will be able to exit the venue peacefully and find their ride home with little to no chaos ensuing. I would instruct security teams to be vague about the threat and let everyone know that they are safe so as to not cause a stampede out of fear. At a later press conference details would be revealed but until then, it is crucial to keep the vent covers relatively unaware of the terrorist threat until everyone is evacuated. Overall I would focus on ensuring staff members are being hypervigilant, not brushing off possible threats as it is better to be overly cautious and under cautious. At the same time being mindful that security fears could increase the fears of the crowd if they are made known.

Following the Manchester attack and similar incidents around the same time, security costs for promoters have risen fast (Brooks). This has to do with the introduction of higher trained guards and new technology such as facial recognition software and vapor wake dogs that can sense out explosives. Shows can longer rely on metal detectors and pat-downs as many security guards either fail or perpetrators find a way to conceal their weapons. Additionally, as the Manchester attack happened outside the arena there has been a movement and increased concern over patrolling around venues, not only the interior (Brooks).

My research will help me implement the utmost safety measures as I work on shows in the future. I will be exponentially weary of not only safeguarding the venue itself but, around it too. I will be sure accurate risk assessments are conducted and that measures directly correlated are put into place. Of all things that can go wrong on the show safety and security are number one and throughout conducting research and writing this paper I've learned the importance of collaborating with multiple sources to ensure the utmost proactive measures that can be taken prior to during and after a show, no matter the venue size.

Works Cited

Brooks, Dave. “How Concert Security Has Changed Following Live Music Tragedies in 2017.” Billboard, 22 Dec. 2017, www.billboard.com/music/music-news/concert-security-changes-2017-live-music-tragedies-inter view-8078488/.

Chameleon. “Chameleon Associates Manchester Attack Security Mistakes.” Chameleon Associates, 30 Oct. 2020, chameleonassociates.com/manchester-attack-security-mistakes/.

De la Hamaide, Sybille. “Timeline of Paris Attacks According to Public Prosecutor.” Edited by Mark John, Reuters, Thomson Reuters, 14 Nov. 2015, www.reuters.com/article/us-france-shooting-timeline-idUSKCN0T31BS20151114#h8KRqimXft utLeR3.97.

Henkels, Patrick. “Grant County Deputies Arrest Suspected Gunman, Prevent Probable Mass Shooting at Concert.” Krem.com, 20 Aug. 2022, www.krem.com/article/news/local/grant-county/grant-county-deputies-prevent-mass-shooting-go rge-ampitheatre/293-0dbd61e2-5113-477e-a7ca-5b490fc31f9c.

“How Many Concerts Have There Been at Manchester Arena?” Concert Archives, www.concertarchives.org/venues/manchester-arena--2.

Hutchinson, Bill, et al. “The Anatomy of the Las Vegas Mass Shooting, the Deadliest in Modern US History.” ABC News, ABC News Network, 23 Dec. 2018, abcnews.go.com/US/anatomy-las-vegas-mass-shooting-deadliest-modern-us/story?id=59797324.

ITV News. “When Was the Manchester Arena Bombing and What Happened?” ITV News, ITV News, 18 May 2022, www.itv.com/news/granada/2021-06-17/manchester-arena-attack-a-timeline-of-events.

Kelly, Robert F, and Dean C Alexander. “Insights from Comparing Pre-Attack Variables in the Las Vegas Mass Shooting with Ideologically Motivated Violent Extremist Attacks.” PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM, vol. 16, no. 3, June 2022, www.universiteitleiden.nl/binaries/content/assets/customsites/perspectives-on-terrorism/2022/iss ue-3/kelly.pdf.

Kerslake, Bob, et al. Kerslake Arena Review. 21 Mar. 2018, www.kerslakearenareview.co.uk/media/1022/kerslake_arena_review_printed_final.pdf.

Rys, Dan. “Live Music after Manchester: Concert Business Faces Security Challenges beyond Its Gates.” Billboard, 31 May 2017, www.billboard.com/music/features/manchester-attack-concert-security-7808714/.

“Security Camera Systems - CCTV Camera World.” Crime Rate, www.cctvcameraworld.com/security-camera-systems.html.